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ALL THINGS IN AGGREGATION: 
REASSESSING THE FOURTH AMENDMENT’S 
THIRD-PARTY DOCTRINE AND THE FOURTH 
CIRCUIT’S APPROACH TO CELL SITE 
LOCATION INFORMATION IN UNITED STATES 
V. GRAHAM* 
INTRODUCTION 
When technology and the law clash with one another, which 
wins? The measured, deliberate pace of the legal field and the often 
breathtakingly rapid evolution of the technological world stand in 
stark contrast with one another and have produced a multitude of 
fascinating conflicts and debates with few clear and easy answers. 
Applying long-standing doctrines from the age before computers to 
the modern world of smartphones is sometimes seamless but, in many 
cases, raises significant questions around the continued applicability 
of these doctrines. Finding answers to these questions is thus a vital 
task. 
This struggle between rights and technology lies at the heart of 
United States v. Graham,1 a recent Fourth Circuit case that 
deliberated the nature and extent of the Fourth Amendment’s 
protection of cell site location information (“CSLI”).2 CSLI indicates 
the cell tower closest to a cell phone user when that user makes or 
receives calls and sends or receives texts, essentially creating a piece 
of information that details the time and place that a person makes a 
call or sends a text.3 In Graham, CSLI collected from cell phone 
providers without a warrant was used to determine and track the 
 
 *   © 2018 James G. McLeod. 
 1. 824 F.3d 421 (4th Cir. 2016) (en banc). 
 2. Id. at 424. 
 3. See Robinson Meyer, This Very Common Cellphone Surveillance Still Doesn’t 
Require a Warrant, THE ATLANTIC (Apr. 14, 2016), 
https://www.theatlantic.com /technology /archive/2016/04/sixth-circuit-cellphone-tracking-csli-
warrant/478197/ [https://perma.cc /FC8P-ZSCE]. Historical CSLI, which is the type of data at 
issue in Graham, is created when law enforcement requests CSLI that has been generated 
by a particular phone. Id. In 2015, AT&T handled more than 58,000 requests for this 
historical CSLI. Id. 
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defendants’ locations during a string of robberies.4 The Graham court 
followed other recent circuit court decisions5 by holding that law 
enforcement did not need to acquire a warrant for this information 
under the third-party doctrine,6 a principle stating that the Fourth 
Amendment does not protect information individuals “voluntarily 
turn[] over to third parties.”7  
The Graham court’s decision raised important questions about 
the conflict between privacy and a number of Fourth Amendment 
doctrines, including the third-party doctrine, in today’s technology-
driven world. Significantly, during its examination of these conflicts, 
the Graham court dismissed an argument by the defendants regarding 
the dangers of the aggregation of CSLI data to determine a 
defendant’s location and track that defendant’s detailed movements 
over a lengthy period of time.8 To defendants, this tracking enabled 
by the aggregation of CSLI was the functional equivalent of long-
term GPS tracking without a warrant, which is barred by the Fourth 
Amendment.9 This aggregation could also raise serious privacy 
concerns.10 In addition to dismissing this argument, the court further 
stated that the defendants improperly attempted to distinguish 
constitutionally protected “content” of communications (i.e., private 
data such as the contents of letters or the conversation of a phone 
call)11 from unprotected “non-content” (i.e., the addressing 
information from letters or packages),12 meaning that the court 
 
 4. Id. 
 5. See United States v. Carpenter, 819 F.3d 880, 889 (6th Cir. 2016) (holding that 
several months of CSLI data gathered from defendants’ wireless carriers was not 
protected because it was not content and the gathering from a third party “can only 
diminish the defendants’ expectation of privacy in the information those records 
contain”), cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 2211 (2017). Carpenter, which dealt with the gathering 
of CSLI information after several armed robberies throughout the Detroit area, see id. at 
884–85, has, at the time of this writing, been granted certiorari by the Supreme Court. See 
also, e.g., United States v. Davis, 785 F.3d 498, 517–18 (11th Cir. 2015) (finding that the 
defendant had “no reasonable expectation of privacy in business records made, kept, and 
owned by” a cell service provider); In re U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d 600, 
610–12, 615 (5th Cir. 2013) (deciding that the voluntarily-given CSLI is not protected since 
“it is established that, when a person communicates information to a third party even on 
the understanding that the communication is confidential, he cannot object if the third party 
conveys that information”). 
 6. Graham, 824 F.3d at 437–38. 
 7. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 744 (1979). 
 8. Graham, 824 F.3d at 433–34. 
 9. See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 413 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
 10. See id. at 415–16. 
 11. Graham, 824 F.3d at 433. 
 12. Graham, 824 F.3d at 433. 
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essentially stripped all non-content third-party data—no matter how 
sensitive or revealing in the aggregate—of constitutional 
protections.13 The lack of a boundary in this area is troublesome 
because a properly considered limit could resolve some of the 
significant fears and criticisms surrounding the third-party doctrine,14 
especially in light of the ever-evolving technologies of the modern 
age. Without such a limit, the government could theoretically, without 
the probable cause required for a warrant, obtain data from 
multitudes of third-party actors who collect various pieces of 
information about citizens in order to build an intimate, detailed 
picture of one’s health, travels, finances, sleep schedules, contacts, 
internet history, purchases, and more. At this point, would the 
government even need a warrant? 
These troubles may have been on the Supreme Court Justices’ 
minds when they granted certiorari in the Sixth Circuit case United 
States v. Carpenter,15 a CSLI case with many of the same concerns as 
Graham.16 Regardless of how the Court holds, crafting a doctrine that 
attempts to grapple with the evolution of technology will be a difficult 
task. In response to the Graham decision and the debates surrounding 
the third-party doctrine and the Fourth Amendment, this Recent 
Development analyzes the Fourth Circuit’s holding regarding the 
aggregation of CSLI data and discusses the potential consequences, as 
well as the potential remedies to these consequences. 
This Recent Development’s analysis proceeds in four parts. Part 
I provides the background of the Graham decision. Part II examines 
 
 13. See id. at 433–36 (“If individuals lack any legitimate expectation of privacy in 
information they share with a third party, then sharing more non-private information with 
that third party cannot change the calculus.”). 
 14. See Jones, 565 U.S. at 417–18 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); Orin S. Kerr, The Case 
for the Third-Party Doctrine, 107 MICH. L. REV. 561, 570–73 (2009) (“If third-party 
services play a growing role in government surveillance, the concern runs, then the Fourth 
Amendment will regulate a smaller and smaller portion of that surveillance; the 
government will be able to collect and assemble ‘digital dossier’ without Fourth 
Amendment scrutiny. To ensure sufficient constitutional protection online, many argue, 
the third-party cases should be overruled or sharply limited to their facts.”). 
 15. 137 S. Ct. 2211 (2017). 
 16. Compare Graham, 824 F.3d at 425 (holding that the CSLI data gathered by police 
was properly gathered without a warrant because the “Court has long held that an 
individual enjoys no Fourth Amendment protection ‘in information he voluntarily turns 
over to [a] third part[y]’” (alteration in original) (quoting Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 
743–44 (1979))), with United States v. Carpenter, 819 F.3d 880, 889 (6th Cir. 2016) 
(discussing the acquisition of CSLI information by the police in a robbery case, as well as 
defendant’s arguments that this acquisition violated the Fourth Amendment because the 
police did not acquire a search warrant), cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 2211 (2017). 
96 N.C. L. REV. 1203 (2018) 
1206 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 96 
 
the third-party doctrine and how the Fourth and other circuits’ 
decisions in cases regarding CSLI fit within this doctrine. Part III 
explores some of the potential ramifications of the Graham decision. 
Part IV proposes a different approach to the aggregation of non-
content under the third-party doctrine based upon an individual’s 
reasonable assumptions regarding how data will be used. 
I.  THE BACKGROUND OF UNITED STATES V. GRAHAM 
On January 17, 2011, Aaron Graham robbed a Dollar Tree near 
Baltimore, Maryland at gunpoint.17 This robbery was the first in a 
string of six armed robberies carried out over several weeks by 
Graham and a number of others throughout the Baltimore area that 
ended only when Graham and Eric Jordan (a fellow defendant) were 
apprehended after a police chase.18 During the post-arrest 
investigation, the police were able to connect the defendants to the 
crime scenes through photographic evidence, eyewitness accounts 
that matched clothing worn by robbers at the crime scene with 
clothing found in a defendant’s home and on their persons, and 
descriptions of the defendants’ vehicle.19 After carrying out these 
searches in the defendants’ residences—searches conducted pursuant 
to search warrants—the government obtained two non-warrant court 
orders for “disclosure of CSLI for calls and text messages” for 221 
days from both defendants’ phones.20 The defendants protested this 
action, arguing that the government violated the Fourth Amendment 
“in seeking and inspecting the CSLI at issue here without a warrant 
based on probable cause.”21 The Fourth Circuit, upon its initial 
consideration, agreed with the defendants’ assertion that this 
gathering of CSLI was an unreasonable search, but it upheld the 
conviction because of the government’s good faith reliance on the 
controlling statute, the Stored Communications Act (“SCA”).22 
 
 17. United States v. Graham, 796 F.3d 332, 339 (4th Cir. 2015), aff’d on other grounds, 
824 F.3d 421 (4th Cir. 2016) (en banc). 
 18. Id. at 339–40. 
 19. Id. at 340–41, 374. 
 20. Id. at 340–41. 
 21. Id. at 344. 
 22. Id. at 343. Evidence gathered in violation of the Fourth Amendment is not 
automatically prohibited in court. Instead, this evidence is subject to the “exclusionary 
rule,” which bars evidence only when “the benefits of deterrence [of future violations] 
outweigh the costs of suppression.” Id. at 361. This test depends on the culpability of the 
government’s conduct, which was not sufficient to bar the evidence here due to the 
96 N.C. L. REV. 1203 (2018) 
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The SCA, which provides a mechanism for the government to 
procure records or information pertaining to electronic 
communications,23 allowed the government to retrieve 221 days of 
CSLI information for both defendants without a warrant.24 The 
statute also permits a governmental entity to collect non-content 
information from an electronic communication service provider 
pursuant to a court order, which requires only “specific and 
articulable facts showing that there are reasonable grounds to 
believe” that the communications are relevant and material to an 
ongoing criminal investigation.25 The SCA thus only requires that 
there be reasonable facts that show that communications like CSLI 
may be relevant to an investigation and does not require any showing 
that a prudent person would believe that any evidence would be 
found at the place of the search.26 
Search warrants, however, require a higher standard—probable 
cause27—which exists when “there are reasonably trustworthy facts 
which, given the totality of the circumstances, are sufficient to lead a 
prudent person to believe that the items sought constitute fruits, 
instrumentalities, or evidence of crime and will be present at the time 
and place of the search.”28 The elevated evidentiary standard for 
probable cause is required whenever a police action constitutes a 
“search” under the Fourth Amendment, which occurs when “an 
expectation of privacy that society is prepared to consider reasonable 
is infringed.”29 Such a showing is a more difficult task than merely 
drawing a connection of “relevancy” by reasonable facts to an 
investigation, which is all that the SCA requires. Thus, the 
government faces a lower bar to procure data like CSLI than it does 
to acquire evidence with a search warrant. 
 After analyzing the government’s CSLI gathering under the SCA 
during its first consideration of Graham, a three-judge panel at the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit found the 
 
apparent constitutionality of the SCA’s application to CSLI prior to the Fourth Circuit’s 
ruling. Id. at 361–63. 
 23. See 18 U.S.C. §	2703(c)–(d) (2012).  
 24. Graham, 796 F.3d at 338, 341.  
 25. §	2703(c)–(d).  
 26. See id.  
 27. U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“[N]o Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause.”). 
 28. Doe v. Broderick, 225 F.3d 440, 451 (4th Cir. 2000) (quoting United States v. 
Suarez, 906 F.2d 977, 984 (4th Cir. 1990)).  
 29. Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463, 469 (1985) (quoting United States v. Jacobsen, 
466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984)).  
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access to CSLI information constituted a search under the Fourth 
Amendment.30 Since searches generate more stringent Fourth 
Amendment protections, the panel reasoned, the SCA’s lower 
standard for collecting CSLI was constitutionally insufficient—
instead, a warrant was needed.31 The panel’s holding was guided by its 
concerns regarding the government’s ability to use CSLI to trace the 
movements of an individual for a long period of time.32 In addition, 
such aggregation and long-term tracking could lead to the discovery 
of individuals’ private lives and personal habits, and the court felt that 
cell phone users have a reasonable expectation that such private 
matters will remain private and not be inspected by the government 
without a warrant.33 Finally, the panel believed that the CSLI 
information at issue was not voluntarily conveyed at all—the “mere 
fact that the information [wound] up in the third party's records” was 
not sufficient for voluntary conveyance by an individual.34 This 
decision, however, did not go unchallenged. 
After the Fourth Circuit’s initial ruling that the gathering of 
CSLI constituted a search that required a warrant, the government 
requested a rehearing en banc by the Fourth Circuit to fully consider 
the Fourth Amendment question, which the court granted.35 The 
Fourth Circuit subsequently upheld the conviction, but it established 
that the collection of the data did not, in fact, violate the Fourth 
Amendment, thus overturning the initial ruling.36 The court 
recognized that a Fourth Amendment search occurs when the 
“government violates a subjective expectation of privacy that society 
recognizes as reasonable,” but this protection ends when information 
is “voluntarily turned over to a third party.”37 It determined that the 
CSLI was, in fact, “voluntarily” conveyed to a third party because of 
defendants’ understanding that cell phone calls necessarily send out 
location information38 and that the defendants had “assumed the risk” 
 
 30. United States v. Graham, 796 F.3d 332, 344 (4th Cir. 2015), aff’d on other grounds, 
824 F.3d 421 (4th Cir. 2016) (en banc). 
 31. Id. (“Appellants argue that the government violated the Fourth Amendment in 
seeking and inspecting the CSLI at issue here without a warrant based on probable cause. 
We agree.”). 
 32. Id. at 345. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. at 353–55. 
 35. United States v. Graham, 824 F.3d 421, 424 (4th Cir. 2016) (en banc). 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. at 425, 427 (quoting Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33 (2001)). 
 38. Id. at 430. 
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of the information being provided to the authorities.39 The court also 
addressed the difference between content and non-content in 
electronic communications but held that the CSLI was not 
communications content, which has constitutional protections.40 It 
stated that even though the CSLI could be “aggregated” to determine 
the location of defendants over a long period of time, precedential 
cases allowed the same sort of effect to pass constitutional muster, 
and that the defendants attempted to “blur” the distinctions between 
non-content and content with their arguments.41 With this holding, 
the court essentially removed CSLI information from the protections 
of the Fourth Amendment, meaning the government need only meet 
the lower SCA evidentiary standard to gather such data in future 
cases.  
II.  THE THIRD-PARTY DOCTRINE, THE CONTENT/NON-CONTENT 
DISTINCTION, AND THE GRAHAM DECISION 
Understanding why the Fourth Circuit dismissed Graham’s 
arguments requires a brief look at the background and development 
of the third-party doctrine and the content/non-content distinction. In 
addition to this doctrinal overview, this Part concludes with an 
examination of the unclear future of the third-party doctrine. 
A. The Third-Party Doctrine of the Fourth Amendment 
In 1967, the Supreme Court moved away from a strict textual 
interpretation of the protections provided by the Fourth Amendment, 
which focused on whether or not a “trespass” had occurred to a more 
subjective, privacy-based test in Katz v. United States.42 This new 
 
 39. Id. at 427. 
 40. Id. at 433–34. The contents of various mediums of communications—including the 
contents of letters and packages, telephone calls, and emails—are protected under the 
Fourth Amendment, but non-content information, i.e., routing or address information, is 
not. Id. at 433. The fact that contents are “sealed” in order to be “fully guarded from 
examination and inspection .	.	. as if they were retained [by the communicator] in their 
own domiciles” gives these contents Fourth Amendment protection. Ex parte Jackson, 96 
U.S. 727, 733 (1877) (holding that the contents of letters are protected by the Fourth 
Amendment). 
 41. Graham, 824 F.3d at 433–34. 
 42. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). Prior to Katz, the Supreme Court had followed a narrow 
“trespass” doctrine that put only physical trespasses and seizures of material objects within 
the purview of the Fourth Amendment. See id. at 352–53; see also RICHARD M. 
THOMPSON II, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43586, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT THIRD-
PARTY DOCTRINE 6 (2014). Prior to Katz, the Fourth Amendment was only understood 
to protect “persons, houses, papers, and effects.” Id. 
96 N.C. L. REV. 1203 (2018) 
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subjective test was articulated in a concurrence by Justice Harlan and 
asked first whether a person had “exhibited an actual (subjective) 
expectation of privacy and, second, [whether] the expectation [was] 
one that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”43 However, 
the Court also held that “[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the 
public .	.	. is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection.”44 
Applying this doctrine in a subsequent case, the Court held that a 
warrant was not required to access bank checks and deposit slips, as 
they were “not confidential communications” but were instead 
“negotiable instruments to be used in commercial transactions.”45 
While these banking records may at first glance seem quite 
confidential to consumers, the fact that these checks and slips still 
consisted of information voluntarily conveyed to a third party 
rendered them unprotected by the Fourth Amendment.46 Going even 
further, the Court determined in a later case, Smith v. Maryland,47 
that the use of a pen register—a device designed to register, record, 
and disclose the numbers dialed on a phone48—did not constitute a 
search and was not a violation of the Fourth Amendment.49 The court 
reasoned that the defendant had “no actual expectation of privacy in 
the phone numbers he dialed” and that he had voluntarily conveyed 
the numbers to the phone company, which lowered the expectation 
he could have in the privacy of the numbers.50 
Analogizing the CSLI at issue to bank records and phone 
numbers, the Graham court found this data to be unprotected by the 
Fourth Amendment because of the third-party doctrine, which meant 
that no warrant was needed.51 Like the bank records conveyed in 
Smith, the CSLI was voluntarily conveyed by the defendants, who 
broadcast their locations through their texts and calls and thus took 
the risk of this information’s recordation by a third party. The lack of 
 
 43. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring); see also Graham, 824 F.3d at 425 
(applying the Katz expectation of privacy test). 
 44. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351. 
 45. See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442 (1976) (“All of the documents 
obtained, including financial statements and deposit slips, contain only information 
voluntarily conveyed to the banks and exposed to their employees in the ordinary course 
of business.”). 
 46. Id. at 442–43. 
 47. 442 U.S. 735 (1979). 
 48. Id. at 741 (quoting United States v. New York Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 167 (1977)). 
 49. See id. at 744–46. 
 50. See id. (using Miller as analysis to determine that the defendant voluntarily 
conveyed numerical information to the telephone company through his dialing). 
 51. United States v. Graham, 824 F.3d 421, 427 (4th Cir. 2016) (en banc). 
96 N.C. L. REV. 1203 (2018) 
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Fourth Amendment protection for voluntarily conveyed information, 
established in Miller and Smith, underpins the third-party doctrine at 
issue in Graham and explains the court’s refusal to apply Fourth 
Amendment protections to the data. 
Another way to understand the Graham court’s refusal to 
protect the CSLI is by exploring the lack of protections given to 
“business records” under the third-party doctrine. The third-party 
doctrine roughly includes two lines of cases.52 The first line (which is 
not at issue here) pertains to information given to so-called “secret 
agents,” who are undercover police agents or informants.53 The 
second line, and the one through which cases like Graham have been 
decided, fall within the “business record” line of cases, which find that 
information voluntarily conveyed to another party in the ordinary 
course of business have no Fourth Amendment protections.54 Both 
the bank records in Miller and the data produced by the pen register 
in Smith were found by the respective courts to be business records.55 
This analysis has been extended to cases confronting CSLI data 
gathering56 and can apply to any number of other entities that may 
reasonably retain records about customers or subscribers.57 Under 
this doctrine, people cannot have a reasonable expectation of privacy 
in information disclosed to a third party that are classified as business 
records.58 
An important distinction must be made between these business 
records and confidential communications to other parties, however. 
When a third party is an “intermediary,” or service that handles a 
communication, the communication is not deemed to have been given 
 
 52. See Kerr, supra note 14, at 566. 
 53. See id. at 567–68. This line of cases essentially holds that statements made to 
undercover officers or informants are not protected by the Fourth Amendment and do not 
require any sort of warrant, as “one contemplating illegal activities must realize and risk 
that his companions may be reporting to police.” Id. at 568. 
 54. See id. at 569. 
 55. See id. at 569–70. 
 56. See United States v. Carpenter, 819 F.3d 880, 889 (6th Cir. 2016) (“This case 
involves business records obtained from a third party, which can only diminish the 
defendants’ expectation of privacy in the information those records contain.”), cert. 
granted, 137 S. Ct. 2211 (2017). 
 57. See United States v. Graham, 824 F.3d 421, 435 (4th Cir. 2016) (en banc) 
(“Indeed, we expect that our banks, doctors, credit card companies, and countless other 
third parties will record and keep information about our relationships with them, and will 
do so for the entirety of those relationships—be it several weeks or many years .	.	.	. This is 
true even when, in the aggregate, these records reveal sensitive information similar to 
what could be revealed by direct surveillance.”). 
 58. Kerr, supra note 14, at 563. 
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over to a third party, and the government must have a warrant to 
access the contents.59 “Simple business records,” however, and 
information given to an intended recipient to be used “in the ordinary 
course of business” do not have the same reasonable expectation of 
privacy and may thus be obtained by the government without 
probable cause and a warrant.60 This distinction is why business 
records like CSLI may be gathered from a business without a warrant, 
while the contents of letters, phone calls, and emails may not, even 
though these communications travel through the business’s networks 
or servers. 
All told, these lines of reasoning and doctrines explain why, 
when confronted with an issue regarding CSLI and Fourth 
Amendment protections, the Graham court found that the acquisition 
of CSLI from a cell-service provider did not require a warrant to be 
gathered. 
B. The Content/Non-Content Distinction 
A separate doctrine—the content/non-content doctrine—also 
plays a role in Fourth Amendment protections, as seen in Graham. 
The CSLI data in Graham was routing information that was deemed 
mere non-content data and therefore does not receive the same 
Fourth Amendment protections as the contents of other 
communications.61 This content/non-content doctrine protects the 
contents of communications from government surveillance without a 
warrant and finds its roots in case law regarding letters.62 The sealed 
nature of letters and similar packages makes the contents “‘as fully 
guarded from examination and inspection’ as it would be if the party 
mailing the letter had retained it in his or her own home.”63 The 
sealed and confidential nature of such communications grants the 
public a “legitimate expectation of privacy” in such communications, 
even though the entrusting of the letter to an intermediary (i.e., the 
post office) means that the letter or communication could be easily 
accessed.64 This content doctrine has been expanded to digital 
 
 59. United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 288 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that the 
contents of emails have a reasonable expectation of privacy). 
 60. See id. 
 61. See Graham, 824 F.3d at 433–34 
 62. See Matthew J. Tokson, The Content/Envelope Distinction in Internet Law, 50 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 2105, 2112 (2009). 
 63. Id. (citing Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 733 (1877)). 
 64. See Warshak, 631 F.3d at 285–86 (holding that the contents of emails are protected 
by the Fourth Amendment). 
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communications like emails,65 as well as non-text based 
communications like phone calls.66 Non-content, however, may be 
accessed by the government without a warrant.67 Non-content 
includes phone numbers dialed by a party, the exteriors of packages 
and letters, and routing information.68 Non-content is not protected 
because there is no “actual expectation of privacy” for this 
information because of the understanding that it is provided or visible 
to a third party.69 
The defendants in Graham attempted to argue that the CSLI 
should have been treated as content instead of non-content by the 
court, as CSLI “record[s] a person’s movements over a prolonged 
period” and that this greater detail raises serious privacy concerns, 
essentially transforming non-content into content.70 The negative 
implications of these privacy concerns are summed up by Justice 
Sotomayor in her United States v. Jones71 concurrence when she 
questioned whether movements should be aggregated to the point 
that the government could determine intimate details of the lives of 
individuals, including political and religious beliefs, sexual habits, and 
much more.72 This aggregation argument made by the Graham 
defendants closely mirrors a theory of Fourth Amendment analysis 
known as the “Mosaic Theory.”73 This theory focuses on law 
enforcement actions in their entirety, rather than looking at these 
actions individually,74 and has been used as a rationale for Fourth 
Amendment searches by at least one circuit court.75 However, the 
court in Graham found that even though all routing information 
records “potentially sensitive activity when aggregated” and that, 
even though CSLI is “not identical to .	.	. other .	.	. routing 
 
 65. See id. 
 66. In re U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d 600, 611 (5th Cir. 2013). 
 67. See United States v. Graham, 824 F.3d 421, 433 (4th Cir. 2016) (en banc). 
 68. Id. 
 69. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 742 (1979) (“All telephone users realize that 
they must ‘convey’ phone numbers to the telephone company, since it is through 
telephone company switching equipment that their calls are completed.”). For a further 
exploration of the content/non-content distinction in other areas of technological change, 
see generally Tokson, supra note 62. 
 70. Graham, 824 F.3d at 433–34 (alteration in original). 
 71. 565 U.S. 400 (2012). 
 72. See id. at 416 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
 73. See Orin S. Kerr, The Mosaic Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 111 MICH. L. 
REV. 311, 313 (2012). 
 74. Id. 
 75. See United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 563 (D.C. Cir. 2010), aff’d in part sub 
nom. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012).  
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information,” it “blinks at reality” to argue that CSLI constitutes a 
“communication of content.”76 Because the CSLI was made up of 
routing information and contained no content, the court determined 
the information to be non-content.77 However, although it is unlikely 
that the content/non-content distinction will be eliminated, recent 
legal events have cast doubt on the future of the Fourth Amendment 
doctrines used by the Graham court, as well as the analyses and 
applications of these doctrines. 
C. The Muddled Future of the Third-Party Doctrine 
The future of the third-party doctrine has recently been called 
into question, both in regard to its application to the gathering of 
CSLI and to its future as a whole, by the recent decision of United 
States v. Jones78 and the recent grant of certiorari by the Supreme 
Court in Carpenter v. United States, a United States Court of Appeals 
for the Sixth Circuit case that also grappled with the Fourth 
Amendment’s application to CSLI.79 Jones demonstrated that a 
number of justices may be willing to reassess the third-party doctrine 
if given the chance.80 Justice Sotomayor stated concerns about 
whether people “reasonably expect” their movements to be recorded 
to such a degree that the government could ascertain intimate details 
about their lives, including “their political and religious beliefs, sexual 
habits, and so on.”81 Justice Alito—speaking for three other 
Justices—argued that long-term GPS government tracking 
constituted a search and could thus not be gathered without a 
warrant.82 
The Supreme Court’s grant of certiorari in Carpenter, a case 
remarkably similar to Graham, indicates that some sort of significant 
change for the third-party doctrine may be on the horizon, especially 
in light of the views expressed in Jones. The Carpenter court found a 
number of defendants guilty of committing a string of armed 
 
 76. United States v. Graham, 824 F.3d 421, 434 (4th Cir. 2016) (en banc).  
 77. Id. 
 78. 565 U.S. 400 (2012). The Supreme Court unanimously held a GPS tracker on a 
vehicle used to monitor a movement was “a search .	.	. within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment.” Id. at 402. 
 79. 819 F.3d 880, 884 (6th Cir. 2016), cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 2211 (2017). 
 80. See THOMPSON II, supra note 42, at 21–22. 
 81. Jones, 565 U.S. at 416 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
 82. See id. at 430. (Alito, J., concurring) (“We need not identify .	.	. the point at which 
the tracking of this vehicle became a search, for the line was surely crossed before the 4-
week mark.”). 
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robberies throughout the Detroit area and featured the same sort of 
warrantless gathering of CSLI information pursuant to the SCA to 
pinpoint the defendants’ location near the scenes of the crimes.83 The 
Sixth Circuit upheld the convictions on appeal and found that the 
collection of CSLI was a collection of business records and therefore 
not a search under the Fourth Amendment.84 The Supreme Court 
granted this case certiorari and recently heard oral arguments.85 
Justice Sotomayor, in her Jones concurrence, has already 
expressed deep reservations about the third-party doctrine and its 
applicability in the digital age,86 and Justices Ginsburg, Kagan, and 
Breyer joined Justice Alito’s opinion that expressed his own concerns 
about long-term government surveillance in Jones.87 The CSLI 
gathered in Carpenter was not gathered through any sort of 
government surveillance, but the practical effect of the information 
gathered still allowed law enforcement to create a map that showed 
the defendants’ movements over nearly a six-month period.88 With 
their concerns around steady, lengthy location surveillance,89 this 
group of Justices may attempt to find a way to prevent CSLI 
aggregation that essentially mirrors the GPS surveillance seen in 
Jones. One other distinction the Carpenter circuit court drew between 
the GPS in Jones and the CSLI before them was the relative lack of 
accuracy and precision of CSLI versus GPS surveillance, with GPS 
being accurate to within fifty feet while CSLI tracking could only 
pinpoint a generalized area.90 To the court, this distinction was fatal to 
the defendants’ arguments, and the court declined to speculate about 
any future technologies.91 However, some of the Justices in 
Carpenter’s oral arguments did speculate about future technologies 
and the degree of precision that CSLI could achieve, with Justice 
Kagan recognizing that technology had already progressed since the 
 
 83. Carpenter, 819 F.3d at 884–85. 
 84. Id. at 890. 
 85. Transcript of Oral Argument, Carpenter v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 2211 (2017) 
(No. 16-402). 
 86. See Jones, 565 U.S. at 417 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
 87. See id. at 430 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 88. Carpenter, 819 F.3d at 884–85.  
 89. See Jones, 565 U.S. at 417 (“[T]he use of longer term GPS monitoring in 
investigations of most offenses impinges on expectations of privacy.”). 
 90. See Carpenter, 819 F.3d at 889.  
 91. See id.  
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initial events of Carpenter to potentially allow tracking in a space half 
the size of the Supreme Court’s courtroom.92 
Other Justices, including newly appointed Justice Gorsuch, 
attempted to explore more exotic alternatives during Carpenter’s oral 
arguments,93 and many of the Justices further pressed the counsel for 
the government about their concerns with long-term tracking.94 
However, the Justices pressed the counsel for the petitioner just as 
hard with their concerns about overturning precedent95 and on the 
difficulties of creating a line or distinction to find government 
tracking unconstitutional without a warrant,96 as well as the 
distinction between location information and the business records in 
Miller.97 All told, the Justices, respondents, and petitioners grappled 
with many of the same issues and faced many of the same decisions 
that the Graham court faced. The consequences of some of these 
decisions—especially if the Supreme Court’s decision mirrors that of 
Graham—as well as some potential solutions are the focus of the 
remainder of this Recent Development. 
III.  CONSEQUENCES AND CRITICISMS OF GRAHAM 
The Fourth Circuit claimed that the intention of the defendants 
in Graham, when they argued that the aggregation of CSLI was 
content, was to “blur this clear distinction” between content and non-
content, and asserted that “[c]onstitutional distinctions are made of 
sturdier stuff” than that which was put forth by the defendants in 
their arguments.98 However, the current constitutional distinction is 
gravely lacking. As technology progresses, the line between non-
content and content is likely to grow ever more blurred. This 
content/non-content distinction was created to guarantee the right of 
people to be “secure in their papers .	.	. thus closed against inspection, 
 
 92. Transcript of Oral Argument at 72, Carpenter v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 2211 
(2017) (No. 16-402). 
 93. See id. at 51–52 (beginning a line of questioning in which Justice Gorsuch moved 
away from the reasonable expectation of privacy approach and instead attempted to 
explore with counsel for the respondent whether or not a defendant may hold a property 
right in her location information). 
 94. See id. at 48, 66, 70 (providing the concerns of Justices Sotomayor, Breyer, and 
Kagan respectively). 
 95. See id. at 15 (questioning, by Justice Alito, about how much precedent the 
petitioners want to overrule). 
 96. See id. at 7–15. 
 97. See id. at 4–6. 
 98. United States v. Graham, 824 F.3d 421, 434 (4th Cir. 2016) (en banc). 
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wherever [the papers] may be.”99 Dismissing the defendants’ 
argument without any great consideration of the merits ignores the 
importance of defendants’ interest in their effects and papers, be they 
technological data or other types of personal information in which 
parties have a reasonable expectation of privacy. Furthermore, this 
could be potentially problematic for the future of Fourth Amendment 
protections. A distinction that does not provide security to the 
contents of communications and other sensitive information ignores 
the very rationale behind the protections given to content in the first 
place. 
A. The Third-Party and Content Doctrines in the Twenty-First 
Century 
As the modern world becomes more technologically advanced 
and interconnected, an ever-increasing amount of potential non-
content data will be produced by technological innovations that may 
fall under the scope of the third-party doctrine.100 In his dissent in 
Graham, Judge Wynn addressed this concern head-on by describing 
several examples specific to cellular devices that could potentially 
lead to far more precise location information.101 For example, tiny 
“microcells”—cell sites small enough to coat roofs, interior flooring, 
and other areas—as well as smartphone “pinging,” through which 
smartphones are in almost continuous contact with cell towers 
regarding their location, could all lead to instantaneous, precise 
tracking of a defendant.102 In Judge Wynn’s view, this sort of precise 
tracking would be allowed under the court’s ruling.103 He further 
raised a concern about the scope, detail, and length of the tracking 
enabled by the aggregation of CSLI.104 
 
 99. Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 733 (1877). 
 100. See generally If These Walls Could Talk: The Smart Home and the Fourth 
Amendment Limits of the Third Party Doctrine, 130 HARV. L. REV. 1924 (2017) 
(discussing the lack of Fourth Amendment protection of personal digital records shared 
with third parties via home automation). 
 101. Graham, 824 F.3d at 448 (Wynn, J., dissenting). 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. at 448–49. Judge Wynn was concerned that the majority did “not decide .	.	. 
that the CSLI employed here was too imprecise or too discontinuous to infringe 
Defendant’s privacy,” which he believed would allow incredibly precise and continued 
tracking under new technologies under the court’s ruling. Id. 
 104. See id. at 447. This long-term tracking also brings to mind the GPS tracking in 
Jones which concerned Justice Alito, who claimed that four weeks of GPS tracking of a 
vehicle was a search. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 430 (2012) (Alito, J., 
concurring). But see Graham, 824 F.3d at 435 (“But Jones involved government 
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Other circuit court judges have expressed similar concerns. For 
example, Judge Martin’s dissent in United States v. Davis,105 a case 
from the Eleventh Circuit, supports Judge Wynn’s argument and 
described the extensive amount of information that Google (as well 
as Facebook, Amazon, and other sites) gathers. This information 
includes websites visited, personal and financial information, the 
specific type of electronic devices used by individuals (i.e., whether a 
person was using their smartphone or laptop), and one’s actual 
location. The dissent highlighted the fact that, under the third-party 
doctrine, all of this data could be gathered by the government without 
a warrant.106 But that is not the end of the problem. 
The biggest concerns regarding non-content data do not arise 
from what information law enforcement can access now, but rather 
what they will be able to access in the very near future. “[C]onnected 
TVs, refrigerators, appliances, [and] home automation systems” 
already exist.107 Smart mattresses that monitor sleep patterns and 
share this data with your phone have been developed, as have smart 
cars that will be connected to cellular companies’ networks.108 
Perhaps most intimate, however, is the range of health trackers, from 
the already-used Fitbit fitness tracker to devices like personal EKG 
monitors, to glucose monitoring systems that can send detailed ten-
day analyses of one’s health patterns to doctors.109 While the precise 
readings and contents of any messages created by these devices would 
be protected, other information shared with third parties from these 
devices could, under the Graham court’s test, be discovered by police 
without a warrant if they were found to be “voluntarily conveyed.”110 
All of this could be aggregated to paint an intimately detailed portrait 
of a person’s life. In other words, while the contents of any messages 
created by these devices may be protected, the aggregation of any 
non-content data and messages over time could essentially render the 
protections provided to the contents of communications moot. The 
 
surveillance of an individual, not an individual’s voluntary disclosure of information to a 
third party.”). 
 105. 785 F.3d 498, 533–45 (11th Cir. 2015) (Martin, J., dissenting). 
 106. See id. at 534; see also In re U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d 600, 623 
(4th Cir. 2013) (Dennis, J., dissenting) (providing further examples of concerns). 
 107. Tim Bajarin, The Next Big Thing for Tech: The Internet of Everything, TIME (Jan. 
13, 2014), http://time.com/539/the-next-big-thing-for-tech-the-internet-of-everything/ 
[https://perma.cc/8YSC-HMQZ]. 
 108. See id. 
 109. See id. 
 110. See United States v. Graham, 824 F.3d 421, 427 (4th Cir. 2016) (en banc). 
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access to the contents of messages requires probable cause so as to 
prevent the sealed and guarded contents of those letters from being 
accessed by the government;111 allowing an aggregation of non-
content data to the point that contents can essentially be read, 
guessed, or easily determined circumvents these protections. To so 
easily overcome these protections goes against the spirit and purpose 
of the Fourth Amendment. 
For instance, consider a theoretical health device worn on the 
wrist that is capable of reading a number of vital health indicators.112 
The benefit of this device is that it automatically sends an alert to any 
number and type of a large list of doctors regarding changes in the 
wearer’s vital signs, allowing the doctors to immediately determine if 
the wearer needs medical treatment, what type of medical treatment, 
and the severity of the situation. Imagine that this device has quickly 
become ubiquitous in modern society due to its ability to recognize 
strokes, heart attacks, the onset of seizures for epileptics, and changes 
in blood sugar in diabetics, as well as its general day-to-day usage by 
the population as a fitness and health tracker. The company that 
produces these devices also produces specialty versions of the device, 
such as one that tracks important health statistics in pregnant mothers 
and sends daily reports to the mother’s OB/GYN to monitor the 
pregnancy’s progress and the health of the fetus. The company does 
not have access to the health readings themselves but does choose to 
keep logs of which wearer sends messages to which doctors in order 
to run diagnostics on its network and keep track of the effectiveness 
of the system. The company pledges to its customers that no contents 
of any alert or message to any healthcare provider can be accessed, 
stored, or retained by the company in any way.113 
 
 111. See supra Section II.B. 
 112. While the device provided in this hypothetical does not currently exist and was 
created by the author to illustrate the third-party doctrine and content/non-content 
distinctions, some of these technologies currently exist and are in use today. See, e.g., 
Bertalan Mesko, Top 10 Healthcare Wearables for a Healthy Lifestyle, THE MED. 
FUTURIST, http://medicalfuturist.com/top-healthcare-wearables/ [https://perma.cc/CB9P-
V4PX].  
 113. Whether or not HIPAA would cover the data tracked by such a device would 
largely depend upon whether or not the device’s manufacturer is a “covered entity” or 
not. See Kristen Lee, Wearable Health Technology and HIPAA: What Is and Isn’t Covered, 
TECHTARGET (July 2015), http://searchhealthit.techtarget.com/feature/Wearable-health-
technology-and-HIPAA-What-is-and-isnt-covered [https://perma.cc/8SVA-VQH7]. Under 
this rule, commercially purchased devices would usually not fall under HIPAA, while 
devices provided by a health care provider, doctor, or other similar entity would. See id. 
Regardless, HIPAA has separate disclosure rules that allow law enforcement to procure 
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However, such a device could still be used by the government to 
gather an intimate and exhaustive picture of one’s health. The 
communications logs kept by the company are analogous to the 
location information kept by the cell phone companies in Graham 
and the phone numbers dialed in Miller because they are considered 
“addressing” and “routing” information.114 Furthermore, the statute 
that allowed the police to acquire CSLI in Graham,115 the SCA, could 
be used to acquire this information, as the SCA allows the 
government to access records of a customer from an electronic 
communication service.116 The information gathered by the 
government through this method would only be the routing 
information between the device’s wearer and her doctors and would 
not include the contents of the messages (in this case, the exact 
readings of the device), but even this routing information could 
provide the government with an intimate look into the life of the 
wearer after its aggregation. For instance, continuous 
communications between a wearer and an OB/GYN could make it 
possible to determine that one is either pregnant or considering 
pregnancy, while a sudden flurry of messages towards surgeons and 
cardiologists could signify a heart problem or an array of other 
significant ailments that a wearer may wish to keep private. While 
such clues and aggregations may not be completely accurate or as 
telling as the actual content of any message would be, enough data 
points could still reach a point where the government has little doubt 
about the meaning behind the communications. All of these 
individual data points could, in the aggregate, provide the 
government with an intimate look into the personal health and well-
 
certain personal information during investigations. See 45 C.F.R. §	164.512(f) (2017) 
(describing the requirements for disclosure of medical information to law enforcement, 
including personal information “in response to a law enforcement official’s request for 
such information for the purpose of identifying or locating a suspect”).  
 114. See Graham, 824 F.3d at 433 (“The Supreme Court has thus forged a clear 
distinction between the contents of communications and the non-content information .	.	.	. 
CSLI, which identifies the equipment used to route calls and texts, undeniably belongs in 
the non-content category.”). 
 115. See id. at 426. 
 116. See 18 U.S.C. §	2703(c) (2012) (“A governmental entity may require a provider of 
electronic communication service or remote computing service to disclose a record or 
other information pertaining to a subscriber to or customer of such service (not including 
the content of communications).”). An “electronic communication service” is defined 
elsewhere in the statute as “any service which provides to users thereof the ability to send 
or receive wire or electronic communications.” §	2510(15). 
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being of any party using these devices without any Fourth 
Amendment barriers. 
An example like this runs into a clear counterargument that asks 
whether or not data of this type is even relevant to police surveillance 
and the Fourth Amendment. However, any such relevance would not 
have to be significant—law enforcement would only have to provide 
“specific and articulable” facts that the data is relevant to an ongoing 
case to pull the data from this device,117 meaning the bar for access to 
the information would not be high if law enforcement were to find 
any reason to collect the data. In any event, this scenario still provides 
a framework for how such modern devices could be accessed by law 
enforcement without meeting the threshold of probable cause. 
Furthermore, the same sort of analysis could work for any variety of 
different devices, from pinging GPS devices installed in cars to 
devices that track IP addresses.118 In the era when a folded map 
functioned as one’s global positioning system and letters and rotary 
phones were the primary means of contacting others, the costs of 
aggregation—of gathering sufficient data to craft a mosaic of a 
person’s life—were steep, inconvenient, and time-consuming. Now, 
however, modern technology makes the creation of a multi-faceted 
portrait far simpler. 
B. Keeping the Current Doctrine Has Consequences, but so Too 
Does Change 
Proponents of the third-party doctrine and detractors of the 
concerns about aggregation may claim that data of this nature still 
falls clearly under the third-party doctrine and, while intimate and 
possibly concerning, the data is still composed of non-content and 
thus cannot require a warrant.119 Under the very broad lines laid 
 
 117. See §	2703(d) (“A court order .	.	. shall issue only if the governmental entity offers 
specific and articulable facts showing that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the 
contents of a wire or electronic communication, or the records or other information 
sought, are relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation.”). 
 118. See United States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500, 510 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that 
using a device that tracked the IP addresses typed and accessed by a defendant was 
“constitutionally indistinguishable from the use of a pen register that the Court approved 
in	Smith” and that the action of tracking IP addresses thus did not require a warrant). 
 119. See Graham, 824 F.3d at 433 (“CSLI is non-content information because ‘cell-site 
data—like mailing addresses, phone numbers, and IP addresses—are information that 
facilitate personal communications, rather than part of the content of those 
communications themselves.’” (quoting United States v. Carpenter, 819 F.3d 880, 887–88 
(6th Cir. 2016), cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 2211 (2017))). 
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down in Graham, they would be correct,120 as the Fourth Circuit 
believes that people today “expect that .	.	. countless other third 
parties” will retain information about them that may not remain 
secret.121 Proponents of the third-party doctrine have argued that it 
provides clarity and a test that is easy to apply and have pointed to 
the fact that an alternative has not been easily created as evidence of 
the doctrine’s validity.122 They also argue that due to the rapidly 
evolving pace of technology, a doctrine that attempts to draw a line 
after aggregation is untenable.123  
An additional difficulty revolves around the practical application 
of any aggregate or mosaic theory.124 Proposing that judges apply 
complex constitutional tests to determine whether or not the Fourth 
Amendment has been violated may only place a heavy burden onto 
judges, who must then try to make sense of complex constitutional 
doctrines and factual situations without a clear test or line.125 Bright 
line tests like the third-party doctrine are easy to administer: if the 
information has been given to a third party, it is unprotected. This test 
is simple to use, predictable in result, and does not impose a heavy 
burden on judges to determine the constitutionality of an action. 
However, clarity, simplicity, and ease of application do not guarantee 
a doctrine’s faithfulness to the Constitution. The protections provided 
by the Fourth Amendment should be the keystone for any doctrine, 
not the simplicity of application. 
The current doctrine may be simple to apply, but it ignores 
growing practical modern realities. The Fourth Circuit and other 
courts have found that an individual has no actual expectation of 
privacy when she “voluntarily conveys” information like CSLI,126 
phone numbers,127 or IP addresses,128 even when she does not 
recognize that she is actively conveying this information to a third 
party.129 According to the Fourth Circuit, this is true even when “in 
the aggregate, these records reveal sensitive information similar to 
 
 120. See id. at 432. 
 121. Id. at 435. 
 122. See Kerr, supra note 14, at 581. 
 123. See Kerr, supra note 73, at 347–48.  
 124. See id. at 346–47.  
 125. See id.  
 126. See Graham, 824 F.3d at 430. 
 127. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 744 (1979). 
 128. See Graham, 824 F.3d at 432. 
 129. See id. at 430. 
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what could be revealed by direct surveillance.”130 The constitutional 
protections that require the government to acquire a warrant to 
access “communications content” (such as the contents of sealed mail 
or emails) still exist,131 but the fact remains that these protections 
become ineffective if the government can use unprotected non-
content information to essentially determine what the protected 
communication may say. In Graham, for instance, the government 
has already shown an ability to closely track a defendant using CSLI 
alone.132 
An acceptance of this concept ignores Justice Sotomayor’s 
concerns in her Jones concurrence regarding the government painting 
a precise picture of one’s life, including their “political and religious 
beliefs, sexual habits, and so on.”133 It also ignores Justice Alito’s 
concern about the rapid decline of what was once one of the most 
significant protections of privacy from government surveillance: the 
technological capabilities of the government itself.134 Months-long 
surveillance efforts would once have taken massive police resources 
and would be reserved for only the most significant crimes; now, 
however, the government can use CSLI and other data to essentially 
track a defendant for weeks without spending significant resources, 
greatly expanding the ability of the government to track citizens.135 
The long-held societal expectation that “law enforcement agents and 
others would not—and indeed, in the main, simply could not—
secretly monitor and catalogue every single movement of an 
individual’s car for a very long period” in this manner was a key 
rationale for Justice Alito when he held that continuous government 
surveillance for four weeks without a warrant was unconstitutional 
under the Katz test.136 Courts have correctly held that Jones only 
places these restrictions on long-term government surveillance and 
tracking,137 but this distinction provides little solace for defendants. 
Creating a detailed account of one’s life from data taken from a 
GPS installed by police versus information taken from a phone 
 
 130. Id. at 435. 
 131. In re U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d 600, 611 (5th Cir. 2013). 
 132. See Graham, 824 F.3d at 447 (Wynn, J., dissenting). 
 133. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 416 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
 134. See id. at 429 (Alito, J., concurring) (“Traditional surveillance for any extended 
period of time was difficult and costly and therefore rarely undertaken.”). 
 135. See id. 
 136. Id. at 430–31. 
 137. See Graham, 824 F.3d. at 435 (“But Jones involved government surveillance of an 
individual, not an individual’s voluntary disclosure of information to a third party.”). 
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company seems like a small distinction, but according to current 
doctrine, it is sufficiently different for defendants to entirely 
surrender their actual expectation that their every move not be 
followed.138 The fact that this small difference in action creates such a 
vast difference in expectations of privacy and in doctrinal results 
presses the boundaries of reasonableness. With a rise in information 
transmitted to third parties by technological devices, the government 
may be able to find out far more about a person than it once could 
have with a warrant. The Graham court worried about blurring the 
line between content and non-content and approved of a clear 
distinction,139 but at some point this non-content, when aggregated, 
could potentially tell just as much—if not more—than content ever 
could, as demonstrated by the health device hypothetical given above. 
At that point, there may be no distinction between content and non-
content at all. 
Regardless of whether or not the information collected by all of 
these sources falls under the traditional third-party doctrine, the end 
effect may be an erosion of Fourth Amendment protections. As 
established in Katz, the Fourth Amendment provides protections 
when persons have “exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of 
privacy” and when that expectation is one that “society is prepared to 
recognize as ‘reasonable.’”140 However, if all information given to 
third parties, even unknowingly, is considered to be “voluntarily 
conveyed,” where does one’s actual and reasonable expectation of 
privacy end and begin? The Fourth Circuit’s decision in Graham (as 
well as those similar decisions in other circuits), and the aggregation 
of non-content that it allows, could paint such a detailed picture of a 
potential defendant’s life that one’s “persons, houses, papers, and 
effects”141 could be laid bare for the government, all without a 
warrant. Regardless of whether or not this information is voluntarily 
conveyed, it would be a return to the days of unlimited government 
searches142 to allow this to continue unchecked. 
 
 138. See id. at 433; United States v. Davis, 785 F.3d 498, 514 (11th Cir. 2015). 
 139. See Graham, 824 F.3d at 433 n.12 (“[T]he content/non-content distinction makes 
good doctrinal sense. The intended recipient of the content of communication is not the 
third party who transmits it, but the person [who is] called .	.	.	. The routing and addressing 
information, by contrast, is intended for the third parties who facilitate such 
transmissions.”). 
 140. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 141. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 142. See THOMPSON II, supra note 42, at 3–4. Thompson laid out the history behind the 
passage of the Fourth Amendment, describing “indiscriminate government intrusions” by 
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IV.  A POSSIBLE LEGAL RESPONSE MOVING FORWARD 
Finding a response to these changing circumstances is 
contentious143 and resists a simple test.144 However, to ignore the 
problem would be an improper response. Instead, the best way 
forward is likely that option touched upon by Justice Sotomayor in 
Jones when she asked “whether people reasonably expect that their 
movements will be recorded and aggregated in a manner that enables 
the government to ascertain .	.	. their political and religious beliefs, 
sexual habits, and so on.”145 People may have an expectation that 
seemingly insignificant individual data points, such as the numbers 
they call, will be recorded or monitored, but aggregating these data 
points to create an intricate description of one’s life that essentially 
circumvents the content protections is surely not “reasonable.” 
However, these aggregations are allowed under the current case law, 
including Graham and Carpenter. Thus, a change is needed to truly 
protect individuals’ Fourth Amendment rights. 
A. A Proposed Test: Does One Have a “Reasonable Assumption” of 
Privacy? 
This Recent Development suggests that courts adopt a rule that 
allows non-content to still be acquired without a warrant but not to a 
point that the non-content could be aggregated into a picture which, 
for all intents and purposes, conveys what the contents of messages 
would have. Such an aggregation approach has already been 
attempted by the D.C. Circuit in United States v. Maynard,146 the 
circuit court decision that eventually became the Supreme Court case 
United States v. Jones. The D.C. Circuit held that the aggregated 
movements of the defendant required a warrant.147 All told, the 
 
the British into private homes that led to “fear of unrestrained government power” and to 
the eventual passage of the Fourth Amendment in response. Id. 
 143. See, e.g., Graham, 824 F.3d at 441–50 (Wynn, J., dissenting); United States v. 
Davis, 785 F.3d 498, 533–45 (11th Cir. 2015) (Martin, J., dissenting); In re U.S. for 
Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d 600, 615–32 (4th Cir. 2013) (Dennis, J., dissenting). 
 144. See the lack of a unified test in United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 402–31 (2012) 
(establishing a traditional “trespass” test via Justice Scalia, a Katz reasonableness test with 
a concern for aggregation by Justice Sotomayor, and a traditional reasonableness test by 
Justice Alito). 
 145. Id. at 416 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
 146. 615 F.3d 544 (D.C. Cir. 2010), aff’d in part sub nom. United States v. Jones, 565 
U.S. 400 (2012). 
 147. Maynard, 615 F.3d at 556–58. The D.C. Circuit found that the most significant 
factor in whether a party has a reasonable expectation of privacy for information is 
whether that information “has been exposed to the public.” Id. at 558. Furthermore, what 
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defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy under the Katz 
test, and the “prolonged GPS monitoring reveal[ed] [such] an 
intimate picture of the subject’s life” that the court found the 
monitoring to be a search.148 This aggregation approach, subsequently 
dubbed the “Mosaic Theory,” analyzes police actions as a collective 
instead of individually.149 If the actions taken by police reach the level 
of a Fourth Amendment search as an entirety, a warrant is needed, 
even if each of the individual actions would not have independently 
required a warrant.150 This approach shows how such an aggregation 
approach may work and serves as evidence that some courts are 
currently responsive to the idea. 
This Recent Development’s proposed test incorporates the idea 
of aggregation that concerned Justice Sotomayor in Jones151 and the 
D.C. Circuit in Maynard,152 and it will be called the “reasonable 
assumption” test. The foundation for this test finds its roots in Justice 
Marshall’s dissent in Smith, in which he argued that “[p]rivacy is not a 
discrete commodity, possessed absolutely or not at all. Those who 
disclose certain facts to a bank or phone company for a limited 
purpose need not assume that this information will be released to 
other persons for other purposes.”153 Parties who provide their 
location by making a phone call should reasonably know that their 
information may be used to locate them at the location of the call. 
This fact has been well established and developed by the courts154 and 
should allow this immediate-location data to still be accessible by the 
police under both the third-party and non-content doctrines. 
However, courts should recognize that customers who provide their 
location for a phone call have a reasonable assumption that their 
phone calls will not eventually be used and aggregated by the police 
to intimately track their movements over a long period of time. While 
 
the police discovered—the month-long movements and location discussed in Jones—was 
not exposed to the public, as the “whole of one’s movements over the course of a month is 
[neither] actually exposed” nor “constructively” exposed, even though each individual 
movement was, in fact, exposed. Id. 
 148. Id. at 563. 
 149. Kerr, supra note 73, at 313. For more background and general analysis into the 
Mosaic Theory, as well as an ultimate rejection by Professor Kerr, see generally id. 
 150. Id. at 336–40. 
 151. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 416 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
 152. See Maynard, 615 F.3d at 556–58. 
 153. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 749 (1978) (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 154. See United States v. Graham, 824 F.3d 421, 430 (4th Cir. 2016) (en banc) 
(discussing both the facts at hand, as well as other cases that held that parties understand 
their exposing of location through phone calls). 
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there may be a reasonable expectation that such a thing could be 
done, they would also have a reasonable assumption that such a thing 
would not be done because of their constitutional right to be “secure 
in their persons, houses, papers, and effects” against unreasonable 
searches155 and because of the vastly different and more intimate 
picture that such an aggregation paints, as compared to a single data 
point. Thus, the dividing line between a gathering of non-content 
given to third parties and an unconstitutional search or intrusion into 
what is essentially the “contents” of messages would be what the 
subjective person would reasonably assume the original information 
would be used to show. 
This approach is different—and more flexible—than the current 
all-or-nothing approach used by courts like the Fourth Circuit. In 
Graham, the court stated that “an individual can claim ‘no legitimate 
expectation of privacy’ in information that he has voluntarily turned 
over to a third party.”156 This is because, “by ‘revealing his affairs to 
another,’ an individual ‘takes the risk .	.	. that the information will be 
conveyed by that person to the Government.’”157 The line here is 
clear: if you keep information to yourself, it is protected, but once you 
reveal it to another, you take on all risks of this information being 
acquired by the government. Under the reasonable assumption test, 
however, this revealing of data will not be the end of the inquiry. 
Instead, a court will have to ask what the person who provided the 
data would reasonably assume this data would be used for. Thus, 
instead of making all revealed data free from all protections, the 
Fourth Amendment will cover unreasonable uses of this data, with 
this “reasonable” analysis happening on a factual case-by-case basis. 
B. Factors to Consider for a “Reasonable Assumption” Test 
A number of factors could be created in order to determine how 
reasonable a person’s assumption would be that information would 
not be used by law enforcement without probable cause and a 
warrant. First, a court could look at how sensitive the revealed 
information is. Information given to lending institutions and to health 
care providers invokes more concern about being revealed than does 
information spoken to a companion on a crowded train.158 In 
 
 155. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 156. Graham, 824 F.3d at 427 (quoting Smith, 442 U.S. at 743–44). 
 157. Id. (quoting United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976)). 
 158. Information given to lending institutions is covered by a federal statute that bars 
the disclosure of any “nonpublic personal information” without providing notice to the 
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comparison, CSLI is arguably not extremely sensitive standing on its 
own. A single data point merely shows a person’s location at a given 
moment, which could easily be in a public place that would otherwise 
have few reasonable assumptions of privacy. 
Second, a court could look to the complexity of the data itself 
before any aggregation. For this factor, the less complex the data, the 
more reasonably a person may assume that this data will not be used 
by law enforcement against them. For instance, having a conversation 
with or giving a map to a police informant has no protections under 
either the current third-party doctrine or this test, as a defendant has 
no reasonable assumption that a drawn map will not be used to 
determine her whereabouts during a crime. These complex sets of 
data are enough to stand on their own and require no aggregation by 
the government. A person has, however, a reasonable assumption 
that a single data point of CSLI will not be used to map out their 
whereabouts, as this data point is far from complete enough to be 
used as a GPS substitute and requires aggregation to get to this point. 
For instance, a consumer swiping a credit card at a store has a 
reasonable assumption that this data point will not be used as a 
collective to determine all of her shopping habits. A phone caller, 
furthermore, has a reasonable assumption that her phone call will not 
be used to track her whereabouts for months. Essentially, a person 
has a reasonable assumption that such singular actions will not be 
used to track far beyond the scope of those actions159—thus creating 
an element that addresses some of the concerns about the aggregation 
of non-content raised above. 
 
consumer prior to the disclosure. See 15 U.S.C. §	6802(a) (2012). This personal 
information includes any identifying information provided to the financial institution by 
the consumer that results from any transaction or was otherwise acquired by the 
institution. See §	6809(4)(A). Health information is also covered under specialized security 
and privacy rules that limits disclosure of personal information to third parties. See 45 
C.F.R. §	164.502(a) (2018) (“A covered entity or business associate may not use or 
disclose protected health information, except as permitted or required by [various Sections 
and Subparts of the Chapter].”). 
 159. Discussing whether or not people should have a reasonable assumption that they 
will not be subject to long-term surveillance raises policy arguments about the desirability 
of government surveillance, privacy, and security that are beyond the scope of this Recent 
Development. Tellingly, however, almost sixty percent of Americans find government’s 
monitoring of communications of American citizens to be “unacceptable.” See Lee Raine, 
The State of Privacy in Post-Snowden America, PEW RES. CTR. (Sept. 21, 2016), 
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/09/21/the-state-of-privacy-in-america/ [https://perma.cc
/QNW7-JVKW]. 
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It is to be noted that this factor does not protect simple, singular 
data points from discovery by the government. Instead, this factor 
must be considered in tandem with what the government is 
attempting to use the data for. If the data is being used for a 
“reasonable” purpose—to determine one’s location during a singular 
phone call, or to determine what store a consumer was in at the time 
of a crime—these single data points are unprotected, as people 
arguably cannot have a reasonable expectation of privacy in these 
singular, public actions. It is only when these singular actions are used 
to paint larger, unrelated pictures that they begin to become outside 
the realm of reasonable assumptions.  
Finally, a court could perhaps look at the technological ease of 
the acquired data at the time of collection versus law enforcement’s 
historical abilities to gather information. This will address Justice 
Alito’s concerns about how investigations that used to take weeks and 
require significant resources and manpower can now be accomplished 
with devices as small, cheap, and innocuous as GPS trackers.160 More 
weight will likely have to go on the first two factors, as a defendant 
likely will reasonably assume that technological advancements will be 
brought to bear against them in an investigation, but considering this 
can act as a brake on the impacts of swift technological changes on 
Fourth Amendment doctrines. Additional factors may be useful and 
necessary for this doctrine to be fully viable, but these will provide a 
starting point for the reasonable assumption test. 
Applied to CSLI gathering, this test would both protect the 
ability of the police to do their jobs while also protecting against 
widespread and lengthy tracking by the government. Police could still 
use CSLI for individual suspects, just over a much more limited 
length of time, to determine whether or not a party was in the area. 
No explicit time limit would be mandated by this reasonable 
assumption test; instead, the amount of time allowed would arise 
from the factors in the test and the underlying data. A few singular 
data points of highly sensitive financial interactions, for instance, 
would lead to a shorter reasonable time for surveillance and 
aggregation, as a user arguably has more of a reasonable assumption 
that sensitive banking actions will be kept private. Letter addressing 
information and CSLI may have a longer reasonable time of 
 
 160. See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 429 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring).  
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observation, as they are more public than these banking records.161 
However, the government could still not gather significant portions of 
this CSLI (and other similar non-content) and aggregate it to a point 
beyond what a person would reasonably assume that information 
would be used for (i.e., to essentially show what the “contents” of a 
message would or to show detailed, long-term tracking). This would 
protect against the concerns raised by Justices Sotomayor and Alito 
in Jones, and would provide a constitutional limit on the aggregation 
of both business records and non-content. This approach would also 
shift away from the all-or-nothing approach to privacy that concerned 
Justice Marshall in Smith,162 and would approach the subject with 
more nuance by recognizing that people may have expectations of 
privacy from the government even when they do interact with third 
parties. This reasonable assumption would have to still allow creative 
uses by law enforcement,163 but even limiting the reasonable 
assumption test to just aggregation would provide privacy and 
security to citizens that the current doctrines do not. This test could 
be adapted to any number of other areas that involve information 
revealed to third parties through the third-party doctrine or to other 
non-content information. To avoid over-complicating the doctrine 
and to protect against future technological developments, this test 
would cover the aggregation of all such information without regard 
for that information’s sensitivity. 
 
 161. As noted above, the Supreme Court in Jones declined to draw an exact line of 
when tracking by the government rises to the level of a search, only finding that four 
weeks was over that unknown line. See supra note 82 and accompanying text. While the 
factor-driven analysis of the proposed reasonable assumption test may prove to be an 
imperfect methodology by which to establish the exact moment in time at which a 
government action becomes a search, such a factor-driven analysis alleviates the need for 
the creation of a hard doctrinal line, which can be difficult to articulate. The difficulties 
with articulating a bright line for when a police action—specifically police tracking—
becomes a search was evident in Carpenter’s oral arguments, during which counsel for 
Carpenter struggled to defend his proposed line of twenty-four hours. See Transcript of 
Oral Argument at 7–15, Carpenter v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 2211 (2017) (No. 16-402). 
 162. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 749 (1978) (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 163. For instance, law enforcement could still make reasonable inferences based on 
individual data points and could use these individual data points under the third-party and 
non-content doctrines to carry out investigations. Just because a single data point—i.e., the 
location from a single phone call—would not be expected to reveal incriminating evidence 
would not prevent the police from using it in that manner. 
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C. Counterarguments to the Proposed Reasonable Assumptions Test 
There are certainly criticisms and weaknesses of this test, as 
there likely will be with any solution to the challenges brought by the 
interaction of technology and the Fourth Amendment. First, this test 
still places the burden on individual courts and judges to make 
difficult, fact-based decisions, which was one of the significant 
concerns about using the Mosaic Theory for the aggregation of 
data.164 However, the inquiry for judges will be different under this 
approach. Instead of looking at aggregated data to attempt to draw a 
line for every search, a judge will merely look to see whether or not 
the aggregated data is being used in a way that is different than how a 
reasonable person would reasonably assume this data would be used. 
Instead of trying to draw lines in shifting sands, judges would just 
have to carry out a reasonableness test. 
One of the more significant criticisms is that this approach would 
make life harder on law enforcement.165 This is unfortunately true, as 
the test would protect data from police discovery without a warrant 
that they can currently access without probable cause. On the other 
hand, the Fourth Amendment exists for the protection of the people 
to be secure in their papers and effects, not to make law enforcement 
easy. This may limit creative detective work that uses the aggregation 
of seemingly insignificant data points to create a picture of a potential 
threat to society. However, the chilling effect claimed by detractors is 
likely not as intense as claimed. For instance, a potential defendant 
has a reasonable assumption that a single IP address of an extremist 
website that he visits will be noticed.166 He has a reasonable 
assumption that his call to a criminal organization will be noticed, and 
a reasonable assumption that law enforcement will spot his departure 
from a business commonly known as a front for a criminal enterprise. 
He does not, however, have a reasonable assumption that all of these 
data points will be used in combination to paint him a criminal, but at 
 
 164. See Kerr, supra note 73, at 346–47. 
 165. See Kerr, supra note 14, at 575–77. In Professor Kerr’s vision, a world without the 
third-party doctrine would allow criminal parties to remain at home in a “bubble of Fourth 
Amendment protection,” thus planning their crimes through channels—such as internet 
searches and phone calls—that police could not access. See id. at 576. Essentially, criminals 
could remain at home and work through remote agents and never be subject to 
observation because of a lack of third-party doctrine. See id. at 575. 
 166. See, e.g., Olivia Solon, Google’s Ad Tracking is as Creepy as Facebook’s. Here’s 
How to Disable It, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 21, 2016, 6:48 PM), https://www.theguardian.com
/technology/2016/oct/21/how-to-disable-google-ad-tracking-gmail-youtube-browser-history 
[https://perma.cc/N8MV-55UY]. 
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this point a prudent person would almost certainly believe that 
evidence of a crime may be found in this person’s home, on his phone, 
or on his person—thus, probable cause has been met, and a resulting 
warrant can allow law enforcement to gather all of the information it 
needs. 
D. Impact on the Current Third-Party Doctrine and Content/Non-
Content Distinction 
While this rule would overturn established precedent that finds 
no expectation of privacy in voluntarily conveyed information,167 it 
would not entirely overthrow the current doctrine.168 A rule of this 
sort would protect against what society is most likely to find 
unreasonable—the aggregation of data into a detailed picture of a 
defendant’s life that would allow the government to essentially 
establish guilt without ever seeking a warrant.169 This aggregation 
would certainly make life simpler for the government to find and stop 
criminals, which is of course a worthy goal in and of itself. However, 
with any government power comes the potential for abuse, and 
granting the government the power to gather limitless non-content 
and third-party data could, when combined with the revealing effects 
of aggregation, essentially create a system of continuous and invasive 
government surveillance.170 The Fourth Circuit may have sought a 
“sturdier” constitutional distinction171 than what is proposed here, but 
the fact of the matter is that a line must be drawn somewhere before 
modern technology further undermines Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence. Whether this means the adoption of the reasonable 
assumption test or some other restriction of the scope of data 
gathering or its aggregation could be a question for the courts or 
 
 167. See United States v. Graham, 824 F.3d 421, 427 (4th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (applying 
the Smith third-party doctrine). 
 168. See id. at 433 (describing how content of messages is protected, but non-content is 
not). 
 169. See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 416 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
 170. For a pertinent discussion of the interaction between the Fourth Amendment and 
the NSA’s large-scale metadata surveillance program, see generally Joseph D. Mornin, 
NSA Metadata Collection and the Fourth Amendment, 29 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 985 
(2014). 
 171. See Graham, 824 F.3d at 434 (stating how, under the defendant’s argument, phone 
numbers dialed, dates and times of the call, and the source of the call would all be 
unprotected, while the cell towers used would be, and how “[c]onstitutional distinctions 
are made of sturdier stuff”). 
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Congress, who, as the Fourth Circuit discusses, plays a large role in 
this process as well.172 Either way, some sort of action is needed. 
One final consideration is that the Graham verdict did not turn 
on the cell phone data at all—there was already other evidentiary 
information that connected the defendants to the crime scene that 
had been gathered under a warrant before the acquisition of the CSLI 
from the cell phone company, including clothing that matched clothes 
worn at the crime scene.173 This is a key point, as increasing the 
evidentiary standard to probable cause for aggregation of non-
content would not withhold evidence of crimes from the authorities 
entirely. Instead, it would merely protect the aggregated data until 
the government could show “probable cause,” which is what the 
Constitution requires.174 Furthermore, this is a standard that the 
police in Graham and Carpenter would likely have met through other 
police work.175 For example, the police in Graham had gathered 
information and other evidence through search warrants—in 
particular, clothes found in the defendants’ homes that matched those 
worn by the robbers at the crime scene176—that would have likely 
made a reasonable person believe that evidence of a crime (i.e., the 
location of the criminals near the crime scene) would be located in 
the CSLI. Until the point that law enforcement has gathered enough 
of such information for probable cause, however, people should be 
able to rest assured that their non-content data and information will 
not be so aggregated that the government will be able to clearly see 
the most intimate details of their lives, be that their long-term 
location, their health, or any number of other sensitive details. 
 
 172. Id. at 440 (Wilkinson, J., concurring) (noting that “[t]hroughout our history .	.	. it 
has been Congress that has taken the lead in .	.	. balanc[ing] the need for a new 
investigatory technique against the undesirable consequences of any intrusion on 
constitutionally protected interests in privacy.” (alterations in original) (quoting Dalia v. 
United States, 441 U.S. 238, 264 (1979) (Stevens, J., dissenting))). Despite this note in the 
Graham concurrence that legislative solutions are often used to resolve conflicts between 
new techniques and constitutional interests, it is quite possible that the Supreme Court will 
be the source of a new test or focus when Carpenter is decided in 2018. 
 173. See United States v. Graham, 796 F.3d 332, 340–41 (2015), aff’d on other grounds, 
824 F.3d 421 (4th Cir. 2016) (en banc). 
 174. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“[N]o Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, 
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing .	.	. the persons or things to 
be seized.”). 
 175. See Graham, 796 F.3d at 340–41. In Carpenter, police based their court orders off 
of a given confession by one of those involved in the robbery. See United States v. 
Carpenter, 819 F.3d 880, 884 (6th Cir. 2016), cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 2211 (2017). 
 176. Graham, 796 F.3d at 340. 
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CONCLUSION 
The Fourth Circuit in Graham itself expressed a reservation for 
the doctrine it was upholding and broadening, saying that if it had a 
“clean slate,” it might protect these large quantities of information,177 
but that it was bound by Supreme Court precedent.178 These 
reservations are further evidence not to avoid the problems posed by 
the aggregation of this data to record sensitive information about 
individuals over time. The Fourth Circuit made a mistake when it 
quickly dismissed CSLI as non-content without addressing the great 
concerns that arise from its aggregation.179 The court argued that 
society has no expectation of privacy when third parties maintain 
records, even when that data may be aggregated so as to reveal 
sensitive information similar to that of pervasive government 
surveillance.180 However, this will be no small comfort to private 
citizens when the government can, without a warrant, look through all 
of the data gathered by the multitudes of third-party actors who will 
have access to their lives to build an intimate, detailed picture of one’s 
health, travels, finances, sleep schedules, contacts, internet history, 
and purchases.181 At this point, once again, the question must be 
asked: would the government even need a warrant? 
The answer to this disquieting question should be an unequivocal 
yes. There will certainly be potential difficulties in the application of a 
reasonable assumptions test, both in application and in the change in 
precedent such a new test would create. However, courts should 
nevertheless hold that all of this non-content data, be it CSLI, health 
data, or messages from one’s smart refrigerator,182 cannot be 
aggregated so as to approach a level of intimacy similar to that which 
would be acquired by the acquisition of the contents of private 
communications and that goes beyond the reasonable assumption 
regarding the way such data will be used. This will not forbid the 
government from ever accessing this information; instead, it will 
merely provide for the reasonable protection of society’s 
 
 177. See United States v. Graham, 824 F.3d 421, 436 (4th Cir. 2016) (en banc).  
 178. See id. at 437–38. 
 179. See id. at 434. 
 180. See id. at 435 (distinguishing Jones as one of impermissible government tracking 
versus that of third party record-keeping in Graham). 
 181. See United States v. Davis, 785 F.3d 498, 536 (Martin, J., dissenting) (describing 
the multitude of ways that third-party actors such as Google, Facebook, and Amazon 
could acquire potentially discoverable information); Bajarin, supra note 107. 
 182. Family Hub Refrigerator, SAMSUNG.COM, http://www.samsung.com/us/explore
/family-hub-refrigerator/ [https://perma.cc/FHV3-YJ5U]. 
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constitutional rights under the Fourth Amendment, and it will give 
courts and citizens a reasonable test to use moving forward into an 
ever more closely connected future. 
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